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TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT OTHER MINDS AND 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY  
 
Almost none of us are skeptics in our daily lives about the existence of other minds. 
On a practical, as opposed to theoretical level, we cannot seriously entertain the 
prospect that our friends and family members may be Zombies, without emotions and 
mental lives. And yet there are prima facie good reasons for thinking that we cannot 
have knowledge of the mental states of others. As Edmund Husserl puts the problem, 
“how can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the name ‘experience 
of something other’, precisely something other?” (Husserl 1960: 94) While another 
Philosophy Compass article highlights some of the different ways that philosophers 
deal with the “problem of other minds”, here we focus on describing some of the 
main arguments for the existence of other minds and intersubjectivity more generally, 
which depend upon a transcendental justification, and which attempt to move the 
debate beyond the supposition of an agent with privileged first-personal epistemic 
access to their own minds, and who then needs to establish some kind of plausible 
inferential connection to other minds.  
 If there is a basic strategy common to transcendental accounts, it is to argue 
that we have certain capacities or experiences – such as perception, thought, shame, 
loneliness, meaningful expression and communication, self-consciousness awareness, 
etc. – for which the existence of others is a necessary condition. Often such a position 
is supplemented by claims regarding a transcendental order of presupposition, for 
example, that relations of knowledge are not basic to our encounter with others, and 
that doubting this derivative relationship of knowledge in fact presupposes a more 
basic relationship with others that remains intact. It might also be claimed, in this 
spirit, that the focus upon our epistemic relationship with other minds presupposes a 
first and second person differentiation, without noting that the very idea of a ‘person’ 
or ‘Ego’ can be understood as itself a response to, and thus dependent upon, the 
Other. These are precisely the kinds of arguments that various continental 
philosophers have mounted, whether it is perception, intensity, sensibility, mood, 
affect, desire, or the unconscious that is prioritized over the knowledge relationship. 
From such a perspective, the problem of other minds occurs only for a reflective 
human who has adopted (or tried to adopt) the view from nowhere, or what Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty calls “high-altitude thinking” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 69). But if a 
condition of possibility of such reflection/knowing is social learning, imitation and 
interconnectedness, then the sceptical problem seems alleviated. 
Of course, transcendental reasoning is understood very differently by all of the 
philosophers involved in this kind of project. For instance, Steven Crowell is correct 
to point out that there is a distinct tension between two contemporary transcendental 
philosophies of intersubjectivity: the neo-Kantian version oriented towards 
justification of principles (in Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, etc.) looks to provide 
non-contingent grounds for social life by taking the structure of dialogue and social 
practice as central; and the phenomenological version oriented towards clarification 
of meaning (in Husserl at least) sees conscious experience as the fundamental starting 
place (Crowell: 31). We will consider both of these trajectories in this essay, although 
it is worth recognising that things are, in fact, even more complicated than this 
typology might suggest. Merleau-Ponty, for example, makes dialogue central to his 
philosophy post-Phenomenology of Perception, and Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Paul 
Sartre, while both still phenomenologists in some sense, also express worries about 
the Husserlian preoccupation with meaning and distance their philosophies of 
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 2 
intersubjectivity from it. Levinas’s philosophy (1979), for example, focuses on the 
other as that which cannot be grasped by consciousness as a totality, but nonetheless 
obliges a response. The face of the other – its infinite difference – is a condition for 
the possibility of experience that is not experienced itself: the irruption or the 
withdrawal of the other that elides our totalising gaze does not present itself to a 
phenomenological intuition; it resists being meaningfully constituted by 
consciousness. Notwithstanding this complexity, it is appropriate to begin with the 
‘founder’ of the phenomenological tradition, Husserl, before considering some of the 
important contributions of Martin Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, all of whom 
use transcendental reasoning as a key part of their analyses of intersubjectivity, and 
finally turning our attention to the work of Peter Strawson and Apel.  
 
 
HUSSERL ON INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
 
As Crowell observes, Husserl himself never claims to offer transcendental arguments 
as such. Instead, he speaks of his project as one of transcendental reflection. 
 
For Husserl the task is not to validate synthetic apriori judgments by means of 
transcendental arguments, but to clarify, by means of a kind of reflection, the 
sense of what shows up as real (‘transcendent’) in various modes of experience 
(Crowell: 32).  
 
The phenomenological project is fundamentally descriptive rather than 
argumentative. Furthermore, Husserl considers it to be a ‘transcendental’ form of 
inquiry not simply because it considers non-empirical conditions for the possibility of 
empirical experience, but more fundamentally because it brackets the assumptions of 
the ‘natural attitude’ as a whole and thereby enables radical reflection upon the life of 
consciousness. Nonetheless, it is possible to reassemble some of Husserl’s reflections 
as transcendental arguments for the following reason. According to Husserl’s 
reflections, various modes of experience exhibit a hierarchical structure; conscious 
acts are more or less ‘basic’ to the extent that they presuppose other conscious acts. 
For example, the judgment that a retaining wall is collapsing is less basic than a mere 
perception of the wall as a retaining wall, since the consciousness of the state of 
affairs asserted in the judgment is ‘founded’ upon the consciousness of the perceptual 
object. There is, then, a hierarchy, or order of presupposition, among conscious acts 
due to the ‘logic’ of experience itself. Now, the ‘founding’ relations exhibited by such 
transcendental reflections are convertible into transcendental arguments since they 
map precisely the possibility conditions governing certain kinds of experience. In 
other words, to the extent that transcendental phenomenology is in the business of 
reconstructing apriori hierarchies among acts of consciousness, it is de facto 
producing transcendental arguments. 
A clear example of such a ‘transcendental argument’ is found in Husserl’s 
well-known discussions of intersubjectivity in Cartesian Meditations (1960) and 
Formal and Transcendental Logic (1969).
1
 In the hierarchy of experiences, Husserl 
claims, experiences of ‘transcendence’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’ require as a 
                                                 
1
 Husserl carried out extensive work on the problem of intersubjectivity, especially in his final years, 
and a large amount of the unpublished material has been available for some time in Husserliana, vols. 
XIII, XIV and XV, although so far only a small portion of this material has been made available in 
English translation. 
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 3 
condition for their possibility the consciousness of ‘other minds’—or, more 
specifically, they require what Husserl calls the “community of egos” (Husserl 1960: 
107). In other words, other minds are a condition for the possibility of experience of 
any object as transcendent, objective and real.  
This seems a counterintuitive claim, to be sure. From an everyday, pre-
reflective point of view, it seems obvious that the world is there for us as something 
real that transcends our own minds, irrespective of other people. If anything requires 
explanation, we might think, surely it would be the experience of other minds. It is 
true, according to Husserl, that I do experience the world as other-than-myself quite 
independently of others. But the world so construed remains essentially the world of 
my experience; it is posited as not-I, and yet it is still the correlate of my conscious life 
and nothing more (Husserl 1960: 97-106). To accomplish the paradoxical experience 
of the world as an object that is genuinely exterior to my own experience of it requires 
other minds. It is only when the world is construed as an object for others (quite apart 
from my experience of it) that it gains its proper sense as a genuinely transcendent 
reality. Similarly, Husserl argues that consciousness of the world with regard to its 
objectivity requires that it be construed as the world for everyone; the objective world 
is the world as it is not just for me but for everyone. And, in this respect too, the prior 
constitution of the plurality of egos (‘everyone’) is evidently a condition for the 
possibility of the constitution of the world as objective (Husserl 1969: 237). These 
reflections lead Husserl to the conclusion that, whereas Kant considered the 
transcendental subject to be the condition for the possibility of objective experience, 
the true transcendental subject is the community of egos: ultimately, transcendental 
intersubjectivity is the metaphysical ground of reality, the “intrinsically first being” 
(Husserl 1960: 156; cf. 1969: 273-75).  
As Husserl is all too aware, these reflections raise the difficult question of how 
we experience other egos. How are we to account for other egos, “who surely are not 
a mere intending and intended in me, merely synthetic unities of possible verification 
in me, but, according to their sense, precisely others?” (Husserl 1960: 89). Husserl 
recognizes that other minds are not strictly ‘given’ in experience (hence the 
distinctive problem of ‘other minds’): “properly speaking, neither the other Ego 
himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else 
belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our exp rience originally” (Husserl 
1960: 108f.). And yet, far from being a problem to be overcome, this inaccessibility is 
crucial for Husserl. Were it not for the insuperable gap between ego and alter ego, the 
alter ego would collapse into my own ego and “ultimately he himself and I myself 
would be the same” (Husserl 1960: 109).  
If we nonetheless experience others, how is this accomplished? Husserl 
responds that it must take the form of an “appresentation”, i.e. the essentially non-
present alter ego must be given-along-with something that is present. And, in this 
case, the thing present is the other’s body. According to Husserl, the body ‘over there’ 
receives its sense as another ego in an “‘analogizing’ apprehension” which takes its 
motivation from my body, already understood as an animate organism, and which sees 
that body ‘over there’ as another animate organism (Husserl 1960: 111). Thus, the 
body of the other is seen as a lived body by virtue of an “apperceptive transfer from 
my animate organism” (Husserl 1960: 110). This presumptive transfer is subsequently 
confirmed by the behaviour of the other, which conforms to my understanding of how 
another embodied subject might act (Husserl 1960: 114). Thus we are able to 
experience others as immediately ‘there’ in the world, and ourselves and the world as 
‘there’ for them. On this basis, it subsequently becomes possible to establish the idea 
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 4 
of the world as a common object of experience for oneself as well as for the other, 
extending to an open plurality of others (‘everyone’) (Husserl 1969: 274). 
Does Husserl thereby prove the existence of other minds? Does he establish 
that there is in fact a real, objective world transcending our conscious experience? 
The arguments he offers are not intended to do either. Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology explicitly brackets all questions of fact and suspends all existential 
commitments—not because he is a skeptic with regard to such commitments, but 
precisely in order to establish a space for investigating the transcendental conditions 
that make possible the experiences of the world and others that would resolve such 
questions. For Husserl, the factual existence of others can only be established by 
experience, and the same is true of the factual existence of realities and objectivities. 
The transcendental reflections he offers consequently only deal with the 
phenomenological interconnections between the transcendental ego, the experience of 
others, and the metaphysical features of the world (e.g. reality, transcendence, 
objectivity). What they do show, however, is that insofar as we experience the world 
as objective or real, we necessarily presuppose the existence of others; and, similarly, 
that insofar as we experience others, we necessarily presuppose the existence of 
ourselves as embodied subjects.  
 
 
HEIDEGGER ON BEING-WITH-OTHERS 
 
According to Heidegger in Being and Time and elsewhere, the entire tradition of 
modern epistemology up to and including Husserl, characterized as it is by an 
obsession with sceptical problems such as the problem of other minds, is the victim of 
a deep misapprehension. Sceptical problems only appear as problems due to the 
unfortunate prevalence of a phenomenologically spurious theory of mind according to 
which we first relate to the world as knowing subjects to objects known. Only on such 
a model does it seem plausible to think that our relationship to the world is an 
achievement of a transcendental subject; and, only on such a model can it seem as 
though our grasp of ‘other minds’ is an achievement of an even more mysterious and 
remarkable kind. Heidegger argues, on the contrary, that these epistemic 
‘achievements’ are dependent upon a prior relatedness to the world (and to others) 
which is not at all an ‘achievement’ but simply a feature of human existence 
(Heidegger: 84-90). Far from establishing a relationship between an initially self-
enclosed sphere of consciousness and some exterior domain, relationships of 
‘knowing’ exploit an interconnectedness between ourselves and the world that already 
obtains, one of practical and meaningful involvement (“Being-in-the-world”). 
Heidegger unfolds this argument with respect to the experience of others as 
follows. There is no problem of other minds for us in our everyday, pre-philosophical 
attitude since in the first instance and ordinarily we do not stand as an ‘I’ over against 
‘Others’, but rather tacitly understand ourselves to be ‘alongside’ or ‘with’ others in 
the world; we do not assign ourselves an absolute priority but count ourselves as one 
among others (Heidegger: 154). In other words, the world of others is not grafted onto 
our solipsistic world. Quite the contrary: the public world constitutes the pre-
established horizon within which we find ourselves situated from the start. Indeed, 
according to Heidegger, it is typically in our interaction with things (Zeug) that we 
have already ‘encountered’ others. For instance, “The boat anchored at the shore is 
assigned in its Being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but 
even if it is a ‘boat which is strange to us’, it still is indicative of Others” (Heidegger: 
Page 4 of 12
Philosophy Compass
Philosophy Compass
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 5 
154). In other words, the world itself contains ‘assignments’ or ‘reference’ to others. 
For this reason, Heidegger claims that just as “a bare subject without a world never 
‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given”, so “in the end an isolated ‘I’ without Others is 
just as far from being proximally given” (Heidegger: 152). Others “are already there 
with us” (152) and “the world is always the one that I share with Others” (155).  
Now, it may appear that, rather than resolving it, Heidegger illegitimately side 
steps the problem of other minds by simply reasserting our naïve belief that others 
exist and then taking this as an inscrutable ‘given’. However, it is important that we 
are clear about what he is claiming. To assert that human existence is primordially 
“Being-with-others” is not yet to claim that there are others who do in fact exist; 
rather, it attributes a feature to human existence as such, a feature that belongs to its 
very existential make-up and is not contingent upon the experience of actual others. In 
Heidegger’s language, “Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with [Mitsein]” (156). 
This means that, just as each of us is always already ‘open’ towards the world around 
us in a non-epistemic relation of practical and meaningful involvement, so each of us 
is always already ‘open’ towards the social world, towards others, in a non-epistemic 
relation which Heidegger calls “Fürsorge” (‘care’ or ‘provision’) (157-61). Thus, in 
the same way that “Being-in-the-world” is supposed to name the condition for the 
possibility of discovering real entities in the world, so “Being-with” is supposed to 
name the transcendental feature of human existence that makes possible interaction 
with others in the world: “Dasein as Being-with lets the Dasein of Others be 
encountered in the world” (157). 
As with Husserl, it is possible to reconstruct from Heidegger’s 
phenomenological descriptions transcendental arguments for this central claim, viz. 
that the structure of “Being-with” is an essential or apriori feature of human existence. 
We might look, for instance, to his assertion that “The Other can be missing only in 
and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very 
possibility is proof of this” (157). Here, using an argument structure found repeatedly 
throughout Being and Time, Heidegger draws to our attention the experience of an 
absence—in this case, the absence of others, the experience of being alone. Such an 
experience cannot be generated by some external object, since there is no external 
object to provoke it. The experience must be explained by recourse to something 
‘within’ Dasein itself, i.e. a disappointed anticipation of others. According to 
Heidegger, the disappointed anticipation attests to the ‘openness’ towards others that 
is intrinsic to human being, an openness which precedes and makes possible both the 
experience of others and the experience of their absence, both concern for others and 
indifference towards them.  
Philosophical puzzles concerning Dasein’s “Being-with” remain, as Heidegger 
readily admits; but these initial observations already represent a challenge to the 
assumption that there is a problem of other minds for an unproblematic ‘I’, and hence 
represent a challenge to the assumption that philosophical reflection can and should 
begin with the givenness of the ‘I’ while disregarding everything else that is ‘given’, 
including the world and other people (151). If the overturning of these assumptions is 
warranted as Heidegger maintains, then Husserl’s attempt to retrace the constitution 
of the community of egos starting form the solitary ego is both redundant and wrong-
headed. For, Husserl’s formulation of the ‘problem of empathy’ disregards the prior 
relatedness to others that Heidegger believes makes possible the experience of others, 
and Husserl is consequently constrained to explain empathy as a “projection” of one’s 
primordially given self-relation into another entity. Heidegger’s objection is plain: 
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 6 
“‘Empathy’ does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does 
‘empathy’ become possible” (162).  
Although this argument has had enormous influence over succeeding 
generations of phenomenologists, it remains contestable and contested. Dan Zahavi, 
for instance, has provided a defence of the Husserlian approach in the face of 
Heidegger’s work (among others) by highlighting the ways in which Husserl himself 
anticipated the main points Heidegger makes (Zahavi, 2001a: 124-37; 2001b: 155) 
and also, more importantly, by showing that Husserl’s approach has the virtue of 
balancing both the experience of the communicability or replaceability of the other 
(emphasized by Heidegger) and the experience of the transcendence or foreignness of 
the other (emphasized, for instance, by Levinas) (Zahavi, 2001a: 159-66, but cf. 
Stawarska: 32-9). As we shall see, a similar dialectic plays itself out between Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty. 
 
 
SARTRE ON SHAME 
 
In the chapter of Being and Nothingness entitled “The Reef of Solipsism”, Sartre 
suggests that idealists and realists both have quite serious problems with establishing 
the existence of the other and typically betray their own theoretical commitments 
when reflecting on intersubjectivity. He then engages with and criticises the work of 
three of his most important predecessors – Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger – before 
proffering his own solution in the chapter, “The Look”.  
Sartre describes a person peering through a keyhole at something on the other 
side of the closed door, captivated by whatever is going on. All of this occurs on the 
level of pre-reflective consciousness; the person is peering through the keyhole, 
entirely caught up in their activity, absorbed in the world. Suddenly though, they hear 
footsteps in the corridor and they are aware that somebody is now watching them. No 
longer concerned with what is going on behind the door, they are conscious of their 
identity as escaping them in ways that they cannot control and they are ashamed of 
this fact. According to Sartre, the experience of shame recognises both that we are 
that object which the Other is looking at and judging, and that the Other sees an 
aspect of us that we cannot control and that requires their mediation. As Sartre 
suggests, “pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object, but in general 
of being an object” (Sartre: 288). As Mark Sacks suggests, in this experience of the 
look we apprehend our embodiment in a manner that is irreducible to the body as 
point of view around which a perceptual field is organised (since our being embodied 
is revealed to us in a manner that is very different from the way it is presupposed in 
our absorbed coping), and also as irreducible to the brute physicalist understanding of 
the body (Sacks: 280). For Sartre, the important philosophical point to take away from 
this example is that the Other who catches the person peeping and causes them to feel 
shame cannot just be another object, but rather must be a subject. In other words, 
Sartre argues that this experience of shame, and of feeling like an object, could not 
happen if other people did not exist. It might be felt that such an ontological 
conclusion is too strong, but for our purposes it is important to note that this feeling of 
shame is impossible to resist; it overwhelms us and there is no room for inference. 
The other who perceives us may not necessarily unambiguously apprehend all of our 
higher-order psychological states, or at least not in the way that we experience this 
pre-reflectively, but they immediately apprehend us nonetheless.  
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 7 
Now it is possible that the person caught peering through the keyhole might be 
mistaken when they think that they have been caught in this precarious position. In 
fact no-one was actually there, and it is hence clear that another person does not 
actually have to be present for an individual to experience shame. This seems to 
suggest that perhaps Sartre has not refuted solipsism and the epistemological 
scepticism that engenders it. Sartre’s response to this is to say that while there may 
not be someone literally there at a particular time and place in which we feel shame, 
at least one other person must exist – or, more minimally, must have existed – for the 
experience of shame to be comprehensible at all (Sartre: 280). Sartre also points out 
that it is significant that upon realising that our shame was initially ‘mistaken’, in the 
sense that there was actually nobody observing us prone and in an abject position, our 
feeling of vulnerability before the Look of the Other is actually far from dissipated; 
on the contrary, it is more likely that we will experience ourselves as an object all the 
more intensely. As Sacks notes, “what I am experiencing, despite there being no 
actual person in the room behind me, is that the world contains some such persons… 
to experience their absence is just to be committed to them existing elsewhere. That is 
just what it is for something to be absent rather than non-existent” (Sacks: 292). 
While I can be mistaken in particular cases, what is necessary is that some such other 
exists (or has existed) for such an experience to be possible.  
Many philosophers have challenged this account of intersubjectivity, including 
Sartre’s ‘fellow traveller’ and existentialist friend (at least for a period of time), 
Merleau-Ponty. For Merleau-Ponty, the other can look at me, penetrate me to the very 
fibre of my being, “only because we belong to the same system of being-for-itself and 
being-for-another; we are moments of the same syntax, we count in the same world, 
we belong to the same being” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 83). In other words, for him, the 
conflict of Sartre’s Being-for-others, which comes about as we attempt to control the 
look of others, is dependent upon the more fundamental experience of 
communication: in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “we are collaborators for each other in 
consummate reciprocity” (Merleau-Ponty 2005: 354). Indeed, it is in this context that 
Merleau-Ponty says (borrowing from Husserl), “transcendental subjectivity is a 
revealed subjectivity, revealed to itself and to others, and is for that reason an 
intersubjectivity” (Merleau-Ponty 2005: 361).  
 
 
TRANSCENDENTAL REASONING ABOUT OTHER MINDS IN ANALYTIC 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
Aside from the important contributions in the phenomenological tradition, there have 
been fresh attempts in recent years to make use of transcendental reasoning in relation 
to the problem of other minds. As Crowell explains, “motivated by the linguistic turn, 
these theories characterise experience in terms of intersubjective contexts: public 
reidentification criteria (Strawson), argumentative discourse (Apel), quasi-
behavioural conditions of understanding (Davidson), and so on. Here the first-person 
plays no grounding role” (Crowell: 32). Indeed, Davidson’s reflections on 
triangulation and his later formulations of the principle of charity are commonly 
thought to involve transcendental arguments, and it is perhaps not a coincidence that 
shortly after this became apparent his work was far less discussed in some of the 
central journals of analytic philosophy (see Duke et al: 7-26).  
It is Strawson, however, with whom such arguments are generally associated, 
and who in fact precipitated a mini-publishing industry on their soundness. In 
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 8 
Individuals, Strawson argues that the concept of person is basic to our understanding 
of ‘mind’, and if we can attribute mind to ourselves (which he says we can) then we 
necessarily have some logically adequate criteria for this that can also be applied in 
other cases, including to identify the minds of others (Strawson: 109). Against the 
argument from analogy, Strawson points out that such an argument depends upon my 
being able to identify my own experiences, which he thinks itself logically depends 
upon the concept of other perspectives. While there is a difference between self-
ascription of mental states and other-ascription of mental states, both are nonetheless 
bound up in the same language-game surrounding the more basic concept of ‘person’. 
By showing that the concept of ‘person’ is more primitive than the abstraction from it, 
which is the concept of ‘mind’, Strawson is thus able to provide an answer to the 
conceptual problem of other minds – e.g. how do we know that it is a single concept 
of mind that persists throughout these two different uses, rather than involving two (or 
more) different concepts, a first person and second person concept? On his view, once 
this descriptive work regarding the connection between ‘person’ and ‘mind’ has been 
done, there is no coherent problem of other minds that requires an inference.  
Strawson’s argument has been subjected to considerable scrutiny. Sacks 
summarizes the most common criticism as follows: “It would seem that [Strawson’s] 
argument cannot establish that the very possibility of me having experience requires 
that there be, or that our experience be construed as being of, other subjects… I must 
have criteria suited to identification of others. But this tells me about the necessity of 
my cognitive apparatus: not about the necessary structure of the world to which it is 
applied” (Sacks: 295). In other words, the argument does not show that the world 
must actually contain others, but merely that we must have criteria for identifying 
them, if they do in fact exist. Arguably it does not show even that the world must 
seem to us to contain others, and this is because Strawson’s position involves a 
“theoretical ascent” as Sacks terms it. It establishes logical dependence between self-
ascriptions and other-ascriptions, rather than phenomenological dependence, and 
Strawson’s chief concern is with ascribing propositional attitudes to the other 
(ascribing beliefs and desires to them) couched in a third person perspective.  
These concerns about Strawson’s approach have led to a general scepticism 
amongst analytic philosophers regarding the usefulness of transcendental 
argumentation. This is partly because of the worry that what looks like transcendental 
necessity may turn out to be a mere contingency: it is hard to exclude the possibility 
of alternative explanations for the phenomena for which one is attempting to identify 
the possibility conditions. As such, claims of transcendental ‘necessity’ risk falling 
into a form of dogmatism (Körner: 317-31). Doubts about transcendental claims also 
stem from the fact that the sceptic can always maintain that it is merely necessary that 
we believe there are extra-mental facts, since this is sufficient to account for the 
mental experience in question, but it does not show that there are any extra-mental 
facts (Stroud: 241-56). In other words, they don’t license any inference to reality, but 
simply show, in the case that concerns us, that it is necessary that I construe the world 
as involving others. Because of these repeatedly expressed reservations regarding 
transcendental arguments, they have not been given much attention in the analytic 
literature on other minds (Chase and Reynolds 2010: 235-51). In the final section of 
the essay, we shall consider whether the work of Karl-Otto Apel provides a more 
trenchant rehabilitation of transcendental argumentation deserving of greater attention 
than it has received so far. 
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APEL’S TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTICS 
 
Like Kant, Apel holds that the task of identifying the non-contingent conditions for 
the possibility of valid or objective knowledge is at the heart of the philosophical 
enterprise. With Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, however, Apel argues that objectivity 
must be understood in terms of intersubjective validity, which he takes to be a status 
that is established through discursive procedures of justification in dialogue between 
speakers. But if this is accepted, then it raises a set of new questions for 
transcendental reflection: What conditions make it possible to raise and to justify a 
meaningful validity claim regarding how things stand in the world or regarding how 
things ought to be in the world? The result, for Apel, is a paradigm shift in 
transcendental philosophy itself: from a focus on consciousness or subjectivity (à la 
Descartes, Kant or Husserl) to a focus on language and the pragmatics of 
argumentative discourse. As such, Apel famously claims that in transcendental 
philosophy the “I think” must be replaced by “I argue” (Apel 1994: 243).  
The rationale for making this ‘paradigm shift’ to a ‘transcendental semiotics’ 
itself rests on a series of transcendental arguments (although Apel himself describes 
the arguments as a critique of “abstractive or reductive fallacies with regard to the 
conditions of possibility for knowledge or thought” (Apel 1998: 45)).  
(i) Apel first makes clear that he accepts as a genuine advance the Kantian 
‘Copernican revolution’ which shows through transcendental reasoning the 
irreducible role of subjectivity in rendering possible the experience of objects. The 
naïveté of the ‘ontological paradigm’—i.e. the style of philosophy oriented to the 
rational order inherent in the world of entities itself—had to be overcome by the 
‘philosophy of consciousness’ (Apel 1998: 47f.). But there is, according to Apel, an 
analogous naïveté at work in the Kantian paradigm, and a second phase of 
transcendental critique is called for.  
(ii) In Kant, the subject-object relation is presented as though it were prior to 
and independent from symbolic mediation, whereas in fact, as Peirce has shown, there 
is a dependency relation between the former and the latter. Interposed between the 
knowing subject and the object known is the sign, or more precisely, the validity 
claim. Without taking into account this symbolic mediation, it is impossible to 
account for ‘truth’ or ‘validity’: an object alone can be neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’ 
(contra Aristotle); a subject’s experience of ‘evidence’ or intentional relation to an 
object can be neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’ (contra Husserl); only a propositionally-
structured claim can be ‘true’ or ‘false’, since the propositional structure is the 
minimal structure susceptible to intersubjective justification (Apel 1998: 47-58). 
Hence, if there is knowledge at all, then there are signs involved (propositionally-
structured validity claims) and the symbolic order has already been invoked.  
(iii) Following Wittgenstein’s private language argument, Apel argues 
furthermore that the public institution of rules of correct sign use among sign users is 
an unavoidable pre-condition for signs to have meaning (or, more precisely, to have 
criteria of sense) (Apel 1994: 102). From this a third transcendental argument follows: 
A symbolic order presupposes a community of sign users. Thus, in order for there to 
be validity, there must be an intersubjective context, a linguistic community.  
(iv) Moreover, according to Apel, language has an irreducible ‘double 
structure’ insofar as it contains both a performative-intersubjective dimension and a 
propositional-referential dimension: one always communicates with someone about 
something. But, if so, then yet another transcendental argument can be mounted: The 
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semantic (i.e. propositional-referential) aspect of the symbolic order implies 
commitment to the existence of the world.  
It follows then that neither the existence of other minds nor the existence of 
the external world is susceptible to sceptical doubt, since any act of doubt involves a 
semiosis—i.e. raises a validity claim—which for its part structurally presupposes the 
existence of both other minds and the external world.  
For their part, according to Apel, each of these presuppositions has 
transcendental force since contradicting them would amount to a “performative self-
contradiction” (Apel 1975: 250). The sceptic may, for instance, attempt to deny that 
there is an external world to which her utterance truly refers, but in the very act of 
doing so, she makes a validity claim which, as Apel claims to show, cannot fail to 
present itself as referring and referring truly, since this is built into the illocutionary 
structure of such utterances. Hence, she cannot make the claim without contradicting 
the content of the claim being made. Similarly, it is not possible within the 
philosophical language game of doubt to doubt everything without falling into 
inconsistency, since the presuppositions of the language game of doubt cannot 
themselves be doubted without being presupposed in the doubting, thus landing the 
doubter in a performative self-contradiction (Apel 1998: 86ff.). The presuppositions 
of argumentative discourse represent ‘transcendental’ foundations in precisely this 
sense and no other. The ‘transcendentalism’ of Apel’s philosophy, therefore, is 
pragmatic rather than hermeneutic in nature: it pertains to the necessary 
presuppositions of speech acts and not to necessary presuppositions of the 
propositional content of speech acts.
2
 His transcendental philosophy aims to analyze 
these and other such non-circumventible (nicht hintergehbar) presuppositions and 
idealizations embedded within the pragmatics of language use, presuppositions and 
idealizations which provide the non-empirical scaffolding that make possible the 
practices of argumentative discourse: e.g. counterfactual assumptions that one’s 
utterance has an intersubjectively sharable sense or meaningfulness, that it is true, that 
it is normatively valid, that it is sincere.  
Whether this pragmatic style of transcendental argumentation is compelling is 
uncertain. On the one hand, such an approach, reliant as it is on the demonstration of 
performative self-consistencies or self-contradictions, seems to pre-empt what 
performative commitments may or may not be built into language games of assertion 
and argumentation, and it may be queried whether specific language games involve 
the particular commitments nominated by Apel. On the other hand, even if the 
commitments in question are universal to all conceivable forms of language game 
involving assertion and argumentation, the occurrence of the supposed “performative 
self-contradiction” is difficult to show and relies on the capacity of the offending 
speaker to ‘see’ the implicit claims his speech acts commit him to (Crowell: 38f.). 
Moreover, Habermas has disputed whether ‘non-circumventible’ conditions of 
possibility should be considered ‘transcendental’ in light of the fact that they are 
strictly neither known ‘prior to experience’ nor ‘non-circumventible’ (we are, for 
instance, able to circumvent the presuppositions built into certain language games by 
simply refusing to play the game) (Habermas 1998: 43-46; 1991: 228-33). 
Nonetheless, what matters for Apel is that the philosophical claims made by his 
                                                 
2
 Put another way, taking its inspiration from the work of C.S. Peirce, Apel’s form of transcendental 
argumentation takes its lead not so much from Kant’s transcendental analytic (as does the 
transcendental argumentation of Strawson, which appeals to ‘categorial schemes’) as it does from 
Kant’s transcendental dialectic, oriented as it is to the reflective reconstruction of the (regulative) ideas 
of reason (Apel 1998: 34ff.; 1992: 252f.). 
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transcendental semiotics are not circumventible by arguments since “then the very 
speech-act of questioning would actually lay claim to those very presuppositions of 
the argumentative discourse I have explicated” (Apel 1992: 253); and, to this extent 
the structures explicated are able to furnish the ultimate justification 
(Letztbegründung) needed in order to defend the possibility of validity against 
sceptical attack (Apel 1975). Within its relatively limited field of application, it is 
possible that the ‘pragmatic’ form of self-referential justification provided by Apel’s 
transcendental semiotics might after all prove to be more robust and less easily 
sidestepped than other forms of transcendental argumentation (Apel 1998: 90ff.).  
Questions remain, but all of the trajectories described in this essay try, in 
different ways, to overcome the predicaments that arise when one begins with a 
certain picture of the mind, to which we have privileged epistemic access, and then 
seeks to establish an external connection to other minds. This traditional approach is 
regarded as a dead-end by all of the philosopher discussed, as it concedes too much to 
the sceptical problematic and makes a non-intellectualist account of intersubjectivity 
impossible. 
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